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Who is a Stakeholder? 
 
Two distinct conceptions of stakeholder have developed in recent decades.  The first, existing in politics 
long before the word “stakeholder” became fashionable, refers to anyone likely to be affected by a decision 
of activity occurring within the domain ruled by a particular government – be it national, local, or municipal.  
Concern for the welfare of stakeholders arises whenever an activity undertaken by government agencies or 
private entities has sufficient impact on a whole society, everyone in a particular locality, or a sufficient 
number of others to make that activity a public concern.  Concern might arise because the activity is 
regarded as inherently hazardous, as with operation of nuclear power plants or aircraft; because an activity 
is regarded as crucial to social cohesion, as had been the primary justification for government provision of 
elementary and secondary education; or because the workings of competitive markets are likely to yield 
undesirable social consequences, such as production of unsafe goods or toleration of hazardous conditions 
in workplaces.  In all of these situations, the individuals, whether government officials or private sector 
managers and workers, making decisions about or carrying on the activity will be expected to conform 
those decisions and actions to laws and regulations established to protect the general public or to submit 
decisions and actions to public scrutiny through government-organized administrative processes.  In the 
public realm, then, the notion of stakeholder derives from notions of government responsibility for the 
general safety and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. 
 
The second conception of stakeholder, using that word and developed in business management manuals, 
applies in relations between a business firm (defined as the managers or owner-managers) and others 
those on which the firm depends for success.  Business management manuals often distinguish between 
“stakeholders in the wider sense” who include any individual or group that affects or is affected by the firm’s 
success and “stakeholders in the narrow sense” who include those on whom the firm depends for survival.  
The first category is very broad – perhaps too broad.  The second category is typically defined to include 
employees, financiers (lenders), shareholders (for publicly-held corporations), suppliers, customers, and 
local community where its facilities are located.  In some formulations it also includes the government 
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agencies directly regulating conduct of business in the areas of the firm’s activity.1  While much of the 
business management literature offers results-based reasons for paying attention to stakeholders and their 
concerns, some writers on firm-stakeholder relations offer ethical justifications.  Some base paying 
attention to the full range of stakeholders on broad notions of fairness.2  Others base concern for 
stakeholders other than shareholders on contemporary definitions of property rights as bounded by 
obligations to respect others’ rights and to refrain from causing avoidable harm rather than as unlimited.3  
Others offer arguments based on equity among those who voluntarily engage in collaborative behavior.  
These maintain that since firms accept benefits from their stakeholders – in the varying forms of work effort, 
loans, material inputs, income, and toleration of some degree of noise, traffic congestion, and other minor 
inconvenience created near the place of business – basic norms of fair exchange require that firms take 
stakeholder welfare into account.4 
 
Management experts emphasize that business firms need to pay attention to other actors as well – 
particularly governments, journalists and social activists – but do not classify them as direct stakeholders 
since they stand in more distant relations to the firm.  At the same time, they are aware that these more 
distant actors can have serious effects on the firm’s business prospects and provide managers with 
suggestions about dealing with them. 
 
Though it is common to define stakeholders as those whose “interests” are affected by decisions or 
activities, the term often encourages readers to think only of material impacts – on stakeholders’ 
possessions, money, or physical health – of firm activity and ignore the psychological or mental impacts.  
The word “welfare” is used in this reading to highlight the full range of possible stakeholder concerns, not 
only physical safety or financial gains and losses, but also to psychological senses of well-being and moral, 
ethical, or cultural notions of propriety. 
 
Two other terms in the definition – “believing” and “directly” – are also important to understanding which 
persons and organizations should be treated as stakeholders.  The term “believing” is used for two 
reasons.  First, it allows including those who anticipate that they will be affected as well as those who have 
already experienced effects.  This is important whenever decisions involved in the policy process include 
planning a project or developing an environmental impact statement about an activity that has not yet 
begun.  Second, it permits including those who firmly believe they are affected even if they cannot point to 
easily-ascertainable physical effects – such as gaining or losing employment, hearing or not hearing loud 
noise, catching or remaining free of a disease, smelling or not smelling foul odors – and indicate precisely 
                                                     
1Though not using the term “stakeholder” the basic idea that firms operate in a web of relationships beyond owner-manager or 
shareholders-managers was expressed in Frank W. Brams, “Management’s responsibilities in a complex world,” Harvard 
Business Review 29 (3): 29-34 (May 1951).  R. Edward Freeman and David L. Reed, “Stockholders and stakeholders: A new 
perspective on corporate governance,” California Management Review 25 (3) 89 (spring 1983) traces use of the term 
“stakeholder” to memos circulated among members of the Stanford Research Institute in 1963. 
  
2 W.M. Evan and R.E. Freeman, “A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism,” in T. Beauchamp and N. 
Bowie, eds., Ethical Theory and Business, 75-93 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988). 
 
3 This line of argument can be traced back to Ronald H. Coase, “The problem of social cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 
(1): 1-44 (1960). 
 
4 For example, Tolbert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Ethics.  San Francisco: Berrett-Kohler Publishers, 2003. 
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how those effects were created by the situation or activity.  While it might be tempting to insist that a 
stakeholder must be able to point to some ascertainable impact of the situation or activity, the truth or falsity 
of belief that one’s own welfare is affected is less important politically than the tenacity with which that belief 
is held.  Those who hold tenaciously to beliefs that they are stakeholders will exert serious effort to be 
included in any discussions of policy regarding that situation or activity even if it would not really affect 
them. 
 
Limiting stakeholders to those whose welfare will be or is directly affected implies that it is possible to 
distinguish between direct and indirect impacts.  When a situation or activity has wide ramifications, the 
distinction may seem somewhat artificial, but it remains relevant because the directly affected are the ones 
most immediately exposed to effects, most able to trace them back reliably to the situation or activity, and 
most likely to react.  For instance, a reduction of employment in a particular area clearly has direct effects 
on the individuals who lose their jobs and the other members of their households.  It will also have a 
notable, though less immediately severe, impact on local businesses if the now-unemployed cease or 
reduce their patronage.  Similarly, emission of nasty odors will be most noticeable near the source, and 
diminish as the odor-filled gas mixes with air and the odor becomes less concentrated.  The lack of visible 
remainders and faster dissipation of odors from gasoline engine exhaust promoted the initial perception of 
automobiles as “cleaner” forms of transportation better adapted to major cities than horse-drawn vehicles.5  
Observers of politics have long observed the difficulty of inspiring political mobilization among those 
experiencing low gains or losses from a situation or activity,6 so those experiencing the weaker indirect 
effects are less likely to involve themselves in contentions with private entities or efforts to bring 
government in to redress imbalances among private actors than those experiencing the direct effects. 
 
Defining Stakeholder Inclusion  
 
The phrase “stakeholder inclusion” can denote a.) the ethical claim that including a wide range of 
stakeholders in decision-making and implementation review is preferable to excluding all or most of them, 
b.) the condition prevailing when stakeholders are involved in planning, decision-making and review 
processes, or c.) the methods of ensuring their involvement. 
 
The ethical endorsement of stakeholder inclusion is rooted partly in the general notion of democracy and 
party in acknowledgment that humans are social creatures.  The democratic roots of stakeholder inclusion 
draw derive from the same beliefs that those called upon to contribute (“no taxation without representation”) 
and/or to obey (“consent of the governed”) should participate in some way in decision-making that animate 
demands that rulers be chosen freely by the ruled, operate according to procedures that are transparent 
and nonarbitrary, and be accountable to the governed for their decisions and actions.  Stakeholder 
inclusion is thus one of several methods used in democratic politics to check the tendency of elites or small 
groups to consider only their own preferences and convenience.  The social creature roots of stakeholder 
inclusion derive from acknowledgement of several facts about human life: 1.) that in both early youth and 
old age humans need assistance from others so cannot live by themselves, 2.) even those in the prime of 
life who live on their own can do so only because they have learned the skills needed for maintaining 
themselves from parents and other people as they grew to adulthood, and 3.) humans benefit spiritually 
                                                     
5 London c. 1900. 
 
6 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 196-); Russell Hardin, Collective 
Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
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and intellectually as well as physically from interaction with other humans.  Yet, to flourish in their groups, 
humans need to be mindful and considerate of others; a lesson summarized in the “golden rule” of “do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.” 
 
Descriptive treatments of stakeholder inclusion focus on whether and to what extent various stakeholders 
are actually included in decision, implementation, and/or activity review processes.  Patterns of stakeholder 
involvement depend on three factors: implications of the activity, ability to organize, and cultural or legal 
norms regarding stakeholder involvement.  Decisions or activities regarded as having minor effects do not 
inspire demands for stakeholder involvement; such demands arise among those who believe the impacts 
are or will be significant.  Participation requires that stakeholders organize themselves for participation.  
These efforts usually begin among a few individuals who feel keenly about the matter, realize that they will 
not have any significant influence in the policy process on their own, and provide leadership for an effort to 
get larger groups of people together.  The individuals who initiate organizing may be members of the 
stakeholder group, but they can also come from outside if members of the stakeholder group accept them 
as leaders.  The legal or cultural norms regarding stakeholder involvement prevailing in a particular place at 
a particular time also influence participation by promoting or discouraging involvement, defining which 
stakeholder groups may be involved, and the methods by which they can secure involvement.  Stakeholder 
groups who regard themselves as unfairly excluded may try to gain inclusion by engaging in forms of 
protest that defy legal norms, but protest will succeed only when prevailing cultural norms include notions of 
civil disobedience and those pressing for inclusion through protest avoid actions that seriously alienate 
others.  
 
The joint impact of all three factors can be seen in the varying fortunes of the labor union movement.  As 
factories and other industrial plants became the main places of employment, and most industrial workers 
lived in cities with only their industrial job for livelihood, wage levels and workplace conditions became 
central to their lives.  Physical proximity – not only in the plant but also in living reasonably close by – made 
the logistics of organizing workers easier.  Yet, how well union organizers fared and the extent of influence 
over business firm decisions unions secured varied considerably from country to country.  Union influence 
on business decisions is greater in Germany, with its system of coordinated national bargaining and 
inclusion of union representatives on corporate boards of directors, than in the USA, where only some 
industries had national collective bargaining, government was less sympathetic to unions, mass labor 
parties with strong links to unions did not develop, and unions never covered as much of the workforce as 
they did in Western Europe.7 
 
Demands for broad stakeholder inclusion in planning and prior impact assessment are strong in many 
countries.  Political philosophers who advocate “strong,” “deliberative,” or “participatory” democracy provide 
philosophical arguments supporting these demands.  They regarded democracies governed through 
elected representatives as woefully incomplete; they argue for taking literally Abraham Lincoln’s definition 
of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”8 through such devices as 
                                                     
7Seymour Martin Lispet and Gary Marks, It didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States. New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2000; Gary Marks, Unions in Politics: Britain, Germany, and the United States in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1989. 
 
8 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, 19 November 1863.  Text available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/gettyb.asp 
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referendums, term limits, recall elections, and participatory deliberative processes.  Enhanced stakeholder 
participation in planning on issues having scientific or technical components is also urged by many students 
of the social impacts and implications of science and technology.  They believe that scientists and 
engineers can provide guidance on questions within their respective knowledge domains, but are too 
closely connected to political elite and/or too caught up in technocratic styles of reasoning to provide 
adequate consideration of all the values at stake in policy choices. 9 
 
Direct involvement in implementation requires being in a position to undertake actions that foster or hinder 
attainment of the desired outcome.  Particular stakeholders’ ability to do so varies considerably.  Most of 
the stakeholders in a bridge or a dam project cannot contribute to the existence or the quality of the bridge 
or dam by their own actions because they lack the materials and skills to build it.  In the early stages of an 
epidemic, public health and hospital or clinical personnel have the most active roles in identifying and 
taking measures to control the spread of disease; if – and as long as – the disease continues to spread, 
increasing numbers of other persons will be required to contribute by taking extra care in personal and 
home or workplace hygiene and obeying quarantine orders.  Similarly, individual, household, and business 
efforts to adopt ecologically sustainable lifestyles or business plans often depend on the existence of 
physical infrastructure like recycling centers, bicycle paths, public transit, or electric grids capable of 
drawing power from as well as supplying power to customers with solar or wind generators. 
 
Demands for stakeholder inclusion in activity review – whether prospectively, as in planning and prior 
impact assessment, or retrospectively, as in compliance monitoring, performance evaluation, and outcome 
assessment – frequently arise because of mismatches between ability to shape activity and exposure to its 
effects.  Corporate CEOs have the final word in decisions about how their factories, plants, or other 
production facilities are built, even if they rely on subordinate executives and engineers for the details, but 
generally work and live far enough away that they are not affected by anything that occurs at the plant.10  
Thus, a decision to use a process involving high-volume storage of toxic chemicals may save the 
corporation some money, but can mean death or severe injury to workers or neighbors if there is an 
explosion or a large gas leak, as in the December 1984 Bhopal Disaster.  Similarly, unless they use it 
themselves, they may not be exposed the risks created by an unsafe product the firm produces.11 
 
Maintaining the involvement of multiple stakeholder groups in review stages is also a way to counter the 
tendency of human social life towards oligarchy.  Adam Smith argued that “People of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against 
                                                     
9 Good discussions of designs for inclusive deliberation on issues having technical components include Daniel Kleinmann, ed. 
Science, Technology and Democracy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000; John Durant, “Participatory Technology 
Assessment and the Democratic Model of the Public Understanding of Science,” Science and Public Policy 26 (5): 313–319 
(1999); Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003.  
 
10 Physical separation was less prevalent in the 19th century.  Alexis Du Pont (1816-1857) and Lammot Du Pont (1831-1884) 
died in explosions at their family’s gunpowder works.  
 
11 In a discussion of Ford Motor Company’s stubborn unwillingness to admit that designers were aware of the risks involved in 
placement of the gas tank in the Pinto model, Robert Hoyk and Paul Hersey The Ethical Executive (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), p. wonder whether the attitude of top executives would have been the same if the owners killed in fiery 
crashes were their spouses and children rather than strangers. 
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the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”12  Robert Michels argued that every sort of human 
associations is subject to an “iron law of oligarchy” by which a small group takes over leadership and acts 
for the whole.13  More recent students of public administration in the USA have noted the development of 
“iron triangles” of mutually-supporting members of Congress, regulatory agency officials, and leaders of 
firms in the regulated industry14 and identified many instances of “regulatory capture” in which the private 
entities being regulated gain effective control over the government agency’s activities through political 
connections with legislators or top political leaders.15   
 
The third usage of the term “stakeholder inclusion” focuses attention on the processes and mechanisms for 
assuring their inclusion.  Awareness of these processes and mechanisms highlights the difference between 
formal inclusion and actual inclusion.  Formal inclusion – the procedures established in laws, administrative 
regulations, or general practices for securing and considering stakeholder views – is necessary for, but is 
no guarantee of, actual inclusion.  The procedures need to be accessible and timely if stakeholder input is 
to have any impact on decision or implementation review.  A process that requires individual, household, or 
small organization stakeholders to travel to a distant city for presenting their concerns or allows such a 
short period for public comment that it is over before many of the stakeholders knew it was open limits 
actual inclusion to those who have the money and time off to travel or have constant access to information 
sources indicating when comment periods open and close.  A process of including stakeholders in 
decision-making that starts only after the basic features of a decision have been worked out among the 
politically well-connected also limits actual inclusion by confining stakeholders to flat-out opposition or 
suggestion of marginal changes. 
 
Contentions over Stakeholder Inclusion 
 
A particular stakeholder’s desire for inclusion is easy to understand.  In practical terms it offers an 
opportunity to protect one’s own welfare; in normative terms it is consistent with notions of being a citizen in 
a democracy.  The intensity of desire for inclusion will vary from situation to situation or time to time, and is 
likely to be more intense when the stakeholder believes the impact of decisions on its welfare will be high or 
when past disappointments suggest a need to pay more attention to policy ideas before they get adopted 
as decisions. 
 
The reactions of decision-makers, administrative agencies involved in implementing or enforcing decisions, 
and other stakeholders whose interests are not entirely parallel are more complicated.  Two broad 
approaches to decision-making coexist, each with articulate adherents.  The first emphasizes the greater 
efficiency and effectiveness of centralizing decision-making and ensuring implementation or enforcement 
through hierarchical organizations with commands going down from the top decision-makers and 
                                                     
12 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) Book I, chapter X, part II, 28th paragraph. 
 
13 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. (German, 1911)  
trans. Seymour Martin Lipset.  New York: Free Press 1966 
 
14 Hugh Heclo, “Issue networks and the executive establishment,” in Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System, pp. 
87-124.  Washington DC; American Enterprise Institute, 1978. 
 
15 One of the first expressions was George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2 (3): 3-18. (1971) 
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information flowing back up to them.  Adherents of this “central processing” model believe that only those at 
the top of the organization have enough distance from details to see the full picture, make the best 
decisions, and adjust implementation most effectively.  Though central processing models suffered 
considerable eclipse in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the failures of Soviet and Chinese central 
planning, the current global financial and economic crisis has revived belief that a degree of central control 
is needed to avoid various forms of market failure. 
 
The other model emphasizes the superiority of multiple, independent decision-makers whose actions taken 
together aggregate into a society-wide choice.  Adherents of this “parallel distributed processing” model 
believe there are many situations in which matters are sufficiently unclear or complex that no one set of 
decision-makers can be sure of making the best choice.  In such situations, they maintain, human societies 
are better served by permitting simultaneous experiments and letting experience with them suggest which 
choices should or should not be adopted more widely.  In their view, decentralized decision and 
implementation do not occur in a social vacuum, rather, similar individual desires, shared social meanings, 
and physical realities produce contexts that enable spontaneous coordination as actors watch what each 
other are doing.  At the same time, the most thoughtful adherents of parallel distributed processing views 
acknowledge that stronger or wealthier actors can use decentralization as well as centralization to their own 
benefit. 
 
The debate between centralizers and decentralizers acquired an additional dimension after 1850 as 
scientific and technical expertise became more important for decision-making.  Centralizers are apt to insist 
that “experts” – or at least those senior enough in their profession to be cognizant of the full dimensions of 
the project on which they are working16 – know more so can make better decisions and design more 
effective implementation than “laypeople.”  In their view, the general public should let them do their job.  
Many decentralizers argue that experts only see the technical and immediate aspects of situations and 
problems, resulting in a tunnel vision that blinds them to longer-term or wider implications of situations, 
problems, and efforts to deal with them.  In their view this blindness can only be corrected from outside the 
community of experts.  Advocates of wider participation in deliberations also argue that experts will 
discount or fail to understand the effects of their activities whenever they do not experience those effects 
themselves.  A non-smoking medical researcher may not understand why a habitual smoker warned 
against smoking when using a personal oxygen tank would light up anyway; an engineer designing in-flight 
navigation systems is not the person who uses them under the stress of storms, mechanical failures, or 
fatigue. 
 
Opinions about who should participate in decision-making processes are also affected by certain basic 
human impulses.  Both individually and as members of closely-knit groups humans combine self-centered 
impulses, which incline them to prefer having their own opinions or desires prevail, with sufficient social 
impulses that they can discuss, compromise and share with others.  The self-centered impulses lead 
stakeholders to prefer that they themselves and others like themselves have a say; the latter lead them to 
acknowledge that others different than themselves also deserve a place in the process.  The tensions 
between the self-centered and the socially-grounded impulses create the ground for disagreements among 
                                                     
16 The mid 20th century emergence of “big science” and “big technology” projects in which large numbers of scientists and 
engineers are engaged has produced a division between principal investigators or senior engineers aware of the whole project 
and junior scientists or engineers who may be working only on a very small part without much understanding of how their part fits 
into the larger project. 
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stakeholders or groups of stakeholders regarding who should be included in deliberative and review 
processes.  Advocates of global civil society typically compensate for what they regard as the strong 
influence of “business” (or, among leftists, “capitalists”) in national and local politics by counterposing non-
profit community or issue-oriented associations to both governments and profit-making corporations.  
Particularly in countries following European “corporatist” models of business-labor-government 
consultation, firm executives are accustomed to working with labor union leaders; in most countries 
business executives are still getting used to sharing deliberative space with a wider range of stakeholders.  
Debates about the proper place of business are not simply debates between centralizers and 
decentralizers because allowing firms to make their own choices can be either a centralizing or a 
decentralizing step.  It is centralizing if compared to the visions of broadly-based community dialogue in 
which a wide variety of social actors have real influence on decisions favored by many anti-globalization 
activists.  It is decentralizing if compared to government management of a centrally-planned economy in 
which every productive enterprise does as instructed by the central planners. 
 
Many stakeholders remain skeptical of business willingness to pay real attention to others’ concerns.  Thus, 
there was significant unease in the NGO community when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan moved 
forward in 1999-2000 with creation of the Global Compact, a UN initiative recruiting multinational and other 
corporations into a network for developing and advancing corporate social responsibility.  In 2005-06 its 
structure was altered to increase input from the “other stakeholders” – labor unions, academic institutes, 
NGOs – involved.17  These changes have not altered the perceptions of those who most strongly believe 
that the Global Compact serves only as a screen for continued corporate wrongdoing18. 
 
Even when business is not involved and business interests not directly affected, rival clusters of 
stakeholder organizations can engage in heated competition for opportunities to present their views and 
participate in pre-decision consultations or post-decision review.  In the 1990s UN Conferences on 
Population and Women became venues for heated competition to influence the agenda and the content of 
programmatic statements pitting feminist and family planning organizations against traditionalist and anti-
abortion organizations on the other.19  
 
Stakeholders and Policy-Related Science or Technical Expertise 
 
Three developments – “big science” requiring government funding for the most significant projects, 
increased public skepticism about the vale of scientific knowledge, and emergence of environmental 
problems requiring analysis of global-scale interconnected ecosystems on which there is incomplete 
knowledge and hence high uncertainty about likely developments20 have increased demands that a wider 
                                                     
17 Changes noted on the Global Compact’s website, www.unglobalcompact.org (accessed 14 January 2009). 
 
18 Various groups’ expression of this view can be found on www.globalcompactcritics.net (accessed 14 January 2009). 
 
19J.H. Thompson and W. Turnball, “The women’s conference: where aspirations and realities met,” Family Planning Perspectives  
27(6):254-8 (Nov-Dec 1995) 
 
20 Many commentators point out the special challenges of developing ecological knowledge that will be useful in the policy 
process.  Ulrich Beck. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications and Barbara Adam, Ulrich 
Beck and Jost van Loon, eds., The Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory.  London/Thousand Oaks/New 
Dehli: Sage Publications., go further to argue that rising environmental concern has triggered a transition from “industrial society” 
in which hazards have local impact and are analyzable in separable, linear chains of events to “risk society” in which hazards 
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range of voices be heard not only on decisions that involve application of scientific or technical expertise to 
policy choices.21 
 
Advocates of greater stakeholder participation in the development and use of scientific and technical 
expertise often present their visions under the name “civic science.”  However, there is little agreement on 
what this term means.  One observer of developments in policy-related uses of scientific knowledge 
distinguishes three versions: “thin,” “stronger,” and “democratizing.”22  
 
The thin conception focuses primarily on the erosion of public trust in the reliability of scientific knowledge 
and in the integrity of scientists as unbiased searchers for truth (or the best understandings of physical 
phenomena available with current theories, methods, and observational tools).  Advocates of the thin 
conception present “civil science” as a method of restoring trust by fostering greater public understanding of 
science and better communication of scientific method and findings to non-expert audiences.  Advocates of 
the stronger and democratizing definitions of “civic science” regard it as insufficient for two reasons.  First, it 
maintains the traditional “top-down” conception of scientist-public relations in which experts have 
knowledge and non-experts should defer to it.23  Second, it fails to the impact of spreading beliefs that 
scientific and technical knowledge is just as clouded by unacknowledged biases as any other form of 
knowledge used in the policy realm.24  Feminists, postmoderns, and adherents of the “strong programme” 
in the sociology of science have succeeded in significantly eroding belief in the “objectivity” of science – 
that any scientist however or wherever situated who applied the best scientific methods would come to the 
same conclusions about physical phenomena.  They have had more effect because scientists and 
philosophers of science acknowledge that there are multiple points at which the observer’s mental activity 
affects the knowledge developed: choosing a phenomenon to be studied, identifying the basic contours of 
the phenomenon, designing the experiments or other observational activities to be undertaken, interpreting 
results of observation to create the data, and interpreting the data to develop the claims about composition, 
dynamics, and effects of the phenomenon presented as the research results.  Where they diverge from the 
most thorough relativists is in views about how far the social position of scientists and the workings of 
power affect the results.  The most thoroughgoing relativists ascribe to power a far more pervasive and 
inescapable impact on the conduct and results of scientific research than the others believe exists.  Efforts 
to link the shape of research results to the researcher’s social place cause considerable nervousness; to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
have widespread, even global, impact and can only be analyzed with more demanding holistic, non-linear models of 
interconnected developments. 
 
21 For example, Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature; Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press).  Rowe and Frewer “Evaluating public participation exercises,” Science, Technology and Human 
Values 29 (4): 512-517. 
 
22 Karen Bäckstrand, “Civic Science for sustainability,” Global Environmental Politics 4(3): 24-xx. 
 
23 E.g., Lynn Frewer and Brian Salter. 2002. Public Attitudes, Scientific Advice and the Politics of 
Regulatory Policy: The Case of BSE. Science and Public Policy 29 (2): 137–145.  
 
24 International Council for Science.  ICSU Series on Science for Sustainable Development 
No. 4: Science, Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable Development.  ICSU and Frank Biermann. 2002. “Institutions for 
Scientific Advice: Global Environmental Assessments and their Influence in Developing Countries.” Global Governance 8: 195–
219 argue the need for more participation by scientists from developing countries. 
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many these seem uncomfortably similar to Nazi claims for superiority of “Aryan” over “non-Aryan” science 
or Stalinist claims for superiority of “proletarian” over “bourgeois” science. 
 
A “stronger” conception of civic science rests on arguments that the task is not to rebuild public trust in 
scientists but to rearrange scientific practice to that the pursuit and the presentation of scientific knowledge 
will become more responsive to the needs of stakeholders and the general public.  Greater responsiveness 
in pursuit of scientific knowledge includes greater consideration beforehand of the potential misuses of 
knowledge, more thorough application of the precautionary principle when the natural environment would 
be affected by activity, greater attention to subjects with broad public relevance, and enlisting the informed 
voluntary cooperation of holders of local knowledge relevant to the subject at hand.  Greater 
responsiveness in the presentation of scientific knowledge involves including stakeholders and the general 
public in deliberation, not merely over how to use scientific knowledge but in selection of the scientific 
knowledge to use.  The bolder versions of this argument rest on a claim that in the big environmental 
questions where large scale and complexity, considerable uncertainty, and high stakes involved, “quality 
control” over knowledge claims must go beyond peer review by other scientists to “extended peer 
communities” incorporating NGOs, the public, industry, and the media to make the knowledge fully 
effective.  Advocates of the “stronger” conception do not claim that public and stakeholder views are 
necessarily more correct than expert views, but do believe that incorporating them increases the number of 
viewpoints taken into account and thereby increases the likelihood of making good policy decisions. 
 
Visions of democratizing science stem from beliefs that citizens and stakeholders should be directly 
involved in every stage of developing and using scientific knowledge because science is a social process 
that occurs inside rather than outside politics.  Thus the norms, institutions and procedures for developing 
scientific knowledge need to be redefined in accordance with democratic principles.  Since participation in 
deliberations on issues that affect citizens’ everyday lives is considered a central feature of democracy, and 
many science and technology decisions have wide ramifications for the public at large, citizens generally or 
more identifiable clusters of stakeholders most directly affected should have a say.25  In the vision of 
democratizing science, citizens and stakeholders would also be included in producing scientific knowledge 
where local knowledge (as in biodiversity or pollution impact studies) or the experiences and perspectives 
of distinct communities (as in medical research into the causes and courses of diseases or congenital 
conditions) are important to understanding the phenomena. 
 
The strongest versions of the democratizing science argument maintain that there is no fundamental 
difference between types of knowledge because scientific knowledge, like all other kinds of knowledge, is 
the contingent product of social processes.26  This means, in particular, that the development of scientific 
knowledge is also limited and channeled by exercises of social power to restrict the questions asked and by 
entrenched discourses to restrict what is thought and said.  A few combine this with variations of radicals’ 
claim that members of marginalized and oppressed groups have deeper knowledge of society than do 
                                                     
25Fischer, Frank. 2000. Citizens, Experts and the Environment. The Politics of Local Knowledge. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press; 
 
26 Daniel Sarewitz. 2000. “Human Well-being and Federal Science. What’s the Connection?” 
in Science, Technology and Democracy, edited by Daniel Kleinmann, p. 92. Albany: State University of New York Press; Clark A. 
Miller and Paul N. Edwards. 2001.  “Challenges in the Application of Science to Global Affairs: Contingency, Trust and Moral 
Order.” in Changing the Atmosphere. Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
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members of dominant groups because the latter know only what the society claims to believe while the 
former know both the professed beliefs and the very different actual conduct.  Their possession of this 
wider knowledge makes including the marginalized and oppressed in deliberations essential to unmasking 
and undoing the distorting effects of social power and discourses.  Others argue that this mix of social 
constructionist views of science and radical epistemology presses too far; that even in a fully democratic 
and inclusive society there will be differences between scientific and other forms of knowledge and 
between expert and lay knowledge. 
 
Critics have pointed out that the arguments in favor of democratizing science are stronger when focused on 
applying scientific knowledge than on developing it.  Opening deliberations to define and assess risk to 
include those who will bear the consequences if things go wrong has strong justification in notions of 
tempering the enthusiasm of those wishing to forge ahead with some activity with the voices of those 
concerned about potential harms.  Unless all forms of knowledge are the same and the expert-lay 
distinction is irrelevant, there is no equally weighty argument for including other social groups or members 
of the general public in deliberations about which of two or more competing conceptions or explanations 
best summarizes some physical phenomenon.  Current procedures for peer review have limitations which 
have been canvassed at length among scientists,27 but conceptualizations of how “more democratic” 
procedures of reviewing conclusions and verifying knowledge claims would proceed remain vague.  In 
particular, advocates of democratizing the acquisition of scientific knowledge need to address two 
concerns.  The first, suggested by recent instances of media hype for “advances” in cloning and cold fusion 
that turned out nonexistent, is what non-experts’ involvement would contribute to improving the process.  
Journalists with weak backgrounds in science believed and eagerly publicized the claims; it required the 
inability of other scientists to replicate the claimed results in their own labs to reveal the deception.  The 
second, suggested in efforts by well-organized social groups to control dissemination of scientific 
knowledge because it contradicts their strongly-held political or ethical positions, is that wider involvement 
may not have the effect of diluting the impact of social power and dominant discourses by making them 
more transparent.  Unless the sharper forms of political contestation are kept from swamping deliberation, 
the process might end up becoming another venue for exerting control over what others can think or know. 
 
The objections that inclusive processes take more time are far less serious than objections that most 
citizens will not participate.  Theorists of “elite democracy” typically argue that low participation is not a 
problem because science and technology issues are beyond the comprehension of less-educated 
segments of the population.  Yet, strong democrats are correct in maintaining that all citizens have 
perspectives to contribute.  However, they are prone to overestimate most individual’s willingness to 
engage in continuous participation.  Yet, there are moments when stakeholders or the citizenry at large 
demand a say.  A democracy that has institutionalized channels for public expression of views in place 
before those moments arise will be able to respond more effectively than one that has to improvise 
deliberative procedures. 
 
                                                     
27 A recent discussion inspired by revelations of data fabrication in stem cell research included "From the blogosphere:. peer 
review for cloning and stem cell research," Nature 447 (#7147), p. xv(1) (21 June  2007); Editorial, "Who is accountable? How 
the responsibilities of co-authors for a scientific paper's integrity could be made more explicit." Nature 450 (#7166), p.1 (1 Nov. 
2007); and L. Bornmann, I. Nast, and H. D. Daniel, “Do editors and referees look for signs of scientific misconduct when 
reviewing manuscripts? A quantitative content analysis of studies that examined review criteria and reasons for accepting and 
rejecting manuscripts for publication” Scientometrics, 77 (3): 415-432 (December 2008).  
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Discussions of global-level problems raise a third concern: that of mis-match between the geographic scale 
of the global problems and the geographic scale of areas covered by inclusive national consultation 
processes.  National-level processes can define a single government’s approach, but unless multiple 
national-level processes yield similar results, there is plenty of room for uncoordinated policy.  A 
considerable part of the impulse inspiring complaints about the “democratic deficits” of intergovernmental 
organizations and multilateral conferences stems from the lack of obvious connection between citizen or 
stakeholder views and international decision-making processes.  Transnational advocacy coalitions, 
transnational social movements, and international nongovernmental organizations seek to aggregate 
stakeholder views, but their access to IGOs and multilateral negotiations remain uneven. 
 
Mechanisms for Stakeholder Inclusion in Decision-Making 
 
National Mechanisms.  Several types of national procedures for securing stakeholder commentary on 
proposed decisions exist around the world. 
 
1. Public hearings before legislative committees providing opportunities for leaders or members 
of stakeholder groups to comment on draft versions of pending legislation or on the progress of 
programs authorized under earlier legislation. 
 
2. Public juries, integrated assessment focus groups,28 consultations, and municipal level 
hearings by zoning boards and other permit-granting bodies provide possibilities for broad 
participation in formulation of alternate issue definitions, identifying possible means of 
addressing issues, and sorting through relative net benefit of each means.  
 
3. Advisory bodies formed by administrative agencies that include members drawn from 
stakeholder groups provide recommendations regarding particular programs.  One example is 
the US Department of Agriculture’s National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry 
Inspection (NACMPI), created in 1971.  It includes members from industry (including 
processors, exporters and importers of meat and poultry), academic research institutes, state 
and local governments, public health organizations, and consumer organizations who provide 
recommendations to the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture on meat and poultry inspection 
programs.29  While giving administrative agencies external input, such committees are not 
regarded highly by advocates of deliberative democracy who see them as too easily dominated 
by the wealthier or more powerful groups.  
 
4. Administrative rule-making procedures including opportunities for public comment on proposed 
regulations.  The notice of proposed rulemaking procedures included in the US Administrative 
Procedures Act of 1946, require federal agencies to publish proposed regulations and provide 
60 days for submission of initial comments and another 30 days for “reply comments” from any 
interested person before proceeding to rulemaking.  When first adopted, this meant publishing 
                                                     
28Gregor Durrenburger, Hans Kastenholz, and Jeanette Bearingar. 1999. “Integrated Assessment 
Focus Groups: Bridging the Gap between Science and Policy.”  Science and Public 
Policy 26 (5): 342. 
 
29 Information from a call for nominations posted at www.usda.gov/  (accessed 28 December 2008). 
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the proposed regulation in the Federal Register; today it means posting to the agency’s 
website and the on-line version of the Federal Register.  The European Aviation Safety Agency 
uses a similar process.  An alternate procedure for “negotiated rulemaking” involves agency 
convening of committees consisting of persons representing all interests affected to work out 
the rule.30 
 
5. Public-private partnerships involve government agencies and certain stakeholder groups in 
particular projects.  European traditions of corporatism, in which government, national 
employer associations, and national labor union federations together establish wage levels, 
workplace safety standards, rules about layoffs, and broad understandings about the proper 
conduct of management-labor relations, involve public-private collaboration, but go beyond the 
usual definition of public-private partnership.  Though some observers treat government 
contracting with private firms to perform particular services, such as build roads or run child 
care centers, as public-private partnerships, others are skeptical on grounds “contracting out” 
is often used to reduce the apparent size of government or to reduce workers’ salaries, 
benefits, and job security. 
  
International Mechanisms.  Intergovernmental organizations provide a number of mechanisms for 
stakeholder input.  These are less elaborate than the mechanisms found in industrial democracies, but are 
more elaborate than in many developing countries.  Their extent reflects the efforts of NGOs and other non-
state actors to secure inclusion, the attitudes of IGO secretariats, and the ability of the more receptive 
member states to persuade the less receptive to accept the mechanisms.  
 
1. The UN occasionally establishes commissions of eminent persons to advise on global issues; 
examples include the World Commission on Environment and Development (Bruntland 
Commission) and the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.  Both of these 
commissions convened a series of meetings in various parts of the world where interested 
NGOs and others could present their views on the questions the commission was asked to 
study.  The World Bank-sponsored World Commission on Dams consulted local stakeholders 
affected by dam construction in the process of developing policy guidelines on such aspects of 
dam construction as environmental and social impact assessment and resettlement 
assistance.31   
 
2. The periodic UN global conferences on population, women, environment, racism, and urban 
areas include “parallel forums” for NGOs where leaders or other representatives of groups 
interested in the issue or issues under discussion meet and talk with one another, seek to 
develop common positions for presentation to the conference, and issue statements 
commenting on the official conference proceedings.  The practice that the forums should 
provide opportunities for direct contacts between forum participants and national delegations at 
                                                     
30 United States Code, Title 5, Chapter 5, section 553 (comment period) and 561-570 (negotiated rulemaking). 
 
31 More and less positive assessments of stakeholder inclusion in the World Commission on Dams are made by Navrok K. 
Dubash, Mairi Dupar, Smitu Kothari, and Tundu Lissu, A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of the 
World Commission on Dams (New Delhi: World Resources Institute, Lokayan, and LEAT, 2001) and Klaus Dingworth, “The 
democratic legitimacy of public-private rule-making,” Global Governance, 11 (1): 65-83 (2005). 
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the conference was so strong by 1995 that the Chinese government’s decision to hold the 
NGO forum in Huairou, about 90 kilometers from the conference itself, and its efforts to limit 
the number of NGO representatives allowed into the country were severely criticized.32 
 
3. The annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF Boards of Governors, World Trade 
Organization Ministerial Meetings, and Group of 8 or Group of 20 summits have been made 
into occasions for public protest by individuals, members of antiglobalization social 
movements, and members of NGOs.  World Bank-IMF annual meetings are held in 
Washington DC, a locale accessible to demonstrators.  WTO Ministerial Meetings and G-8 or 
G-20 summits are held in different places, and since the 1999 “battle in Seattle” these have 
often been selected for remoteness. 
 
4. Public-private partnerships at the international level include IGOs and national governments 
participating in joint initiatives with private organizations.  Typical of many such partnerships is 
the World Economic Forum-sponsored Jordan Education Initiative, which includes six sets of 
partners:33 
 
 
   government   global private 
   of Jordan  sector 
 
 academic       local 
 experts        industry 
 
   local NGOs  international and 
      regional IGOs 
 
 
Others include cooperation between the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and major 
private humanitarian organizations like Oxfam and Médcins sans Frontières.  These have somewhat 
different dynamics because local groups do not participate directly. 
 
Mechanisms for stakeholder inclusion in Monitoring Compliance 
 
Policy analysts often distinguish between “police patrol” and “fire alarm” systems for monitoring the 
activities of actors whose behavior is covered by a policy.34   In “police patrol” systems government officials 
monitor activity by site visits to factories, shops, and other places of relevant activity; in “fire alarm” systems 
                                                     
32 Carol Ann Traut, “Policy implementation in an international setting: A case study of China and the 1995 United Nations 
Conference on Women,” International Journal of Public Administration 22 (2): (1999). 
 
33 World Economic Forum Jordan Education Initiative, 2003 diagrammed in Geoffrey Allen Pigman, The World Economic Forum 
London: Routledge, 2007, p.10. 
 
34 Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms.” 
American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 16-79. 
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government officials act after complaints by private persons harmed by another’s activity.  Stakeholders 
have no formal role in “police patrol” systems (though their complaints may inspire a site visit); officials 
undertake all the monitoring and pressing for correction when it is needed.  Stakeholders have a formal role 
as direct providers of information on which officials base their actions in “fire alarm” systems.  As the 
analogies suggest, “fire alarm” systems work best when stakeholders are motivated to provide timely 
information – they understand immediately that they are being harmed, they are not intimidated into non-
reporting, and they are not worried about attracting official attention to themselves by reporting because 
they have nothing to hide regarding their own conduct. 
 
National-level mechanisms 
 
1. Government complaint procedures, whether communication with administrative agencies or 
lawsuits, give persons and organizations scope for calling attention to actions or inactions by 
other persons or organizations.  Lawsuits typically require the complainer to show that it is 
suffering harm, though in some countries (including the USA and India) it is possible to file a 
lawsuit intended to secure a judgment that some government official has failed to perform a 
duty and must now perform it.  That duty might involve such things as factory inspections, 
emissions monitoring, or completion of a stalled project.  Rights to complain to an 
administrative agency may or may be tied to direct harm. 
 
2. “Whistle-blowing” – reporting on action or inaction that appears likely to hinder reaching policy 
goals by persons within the delinquent organization – is quite different.  Here the person 
raising the complaint is probably not being harmed by the action or inaction, but regards it as 
sufficiently bad, and the prospects of getting the organization to self-correct as sufficiently slim, 
to communicate concerns to government officials, journalists, or, with private companies, to the 
shareholders.  Whistle-blowers are caught between their roles; as employees or members of 
the organization they owe it certain duties, but as a residential neighbor, a citizen, or a 
professional they have obligations to the rest of the community. 
 
3. A very distinct form of stakeholder monitoring arises when the set of stakeholders most directly 
involved in some activity establish stakeholder community self-monitoring.  Such systems of 
mutual monitoring are common among co-users of irrigation systems, grazing lands, or near-
shore fishing areas, and are usually linked to systems under which the members of the user 
community make decisions about the rate withdrawing resources from the shared resource 
pool.35 
 
International-level mechanisms 
 
1. An international-level analog to stakeholder self-monitoring can be found in the systems of 
implementation review established in global or regional multilateral agreements, particularly in 
                                                     
35 E.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons:  the evolution of institutions for collective action.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.; Clark C. Gibson, Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. People and Forests Communities, 
Institutions, and Governance.  Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000.   
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areas of human rights and environmental protection.36  In these systems, each government 
reports about its own or its citizens’ performance of obligations to a central secretariat, then the 
reports are discussed with the reporting government by a committee charged with reviewing 
and commenting on the information provided.  At their best, these systems provide effective 
peer pressure among governments. 
 
2. Non-state entities are allowed to comment on government reports in the monitoring systems 
established under some international human rights treaties.  The International Labor 
Organization’s system for monitoring government compliance with international labor 
conventions begins with the government submitting a report that is sent simultaneously to the 
labor union and employer associations of that country.  Their representatives then file 
comments with the ILO secretariat that become part of the ILO review of the country’s record. 
37  The UN Human Rights Council (which replaced the UN Human Rights Commission 2005) 
and the “treaty-based committees” that monitor compliance with the International Covenants 
on Human Rights, the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention 
on Elimination of Discrimination against Women all receive communications from individuals 
complaining about violations of their rights, and can use them to determine where there is a 
pattern of violations in a particular country that requires attention. 
 
3. Systems of individual complaint leading to taking up a particular human rights violation with the 
government involved are most completely institutionalized in the European and Inter-American 
human rights systems.  In the Inter-American system individuals first contact the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission.  If the Commission believes there has been a violation 
of rights protected by the regional treaty, it first tries to mediate a settlement between the 
government and the complaining individual or individuals.  If that fails, the commission can 
refer the matter to the regional Human Rights Court for a ruling.38  In the European system, 
individuals who believe their rights have been violated can apply directly to the European 
Court.39  The UN-sponsored human rights treaties include “optional clauses” under which 
governments can also agree to let the committee deal with the merits of individual 
complaints.40  
 
 
Questions for discussion 
 
                                                     
36 Elements of effective environmental review systems are analyzed in David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, 
eds., Systems of Implementation Review.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
 
37 Government reports, labor and employer communications about the reports, and ILO committee comments are available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/index.htm  (accessed 30 July 2009).  
 
38 More information about the Inter-American Commission is available on its website http://www.cidh.oas.org/defaulte.htm 
(accessed 30 July 2009). 
 
39 The European Court of Human Rights is run by the Council of Europe, a different IGO than the European Union.  More 
information about the court can be found on its website, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (accessed 30 July 2009). 
 
40 Julie Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights.  London: Routledge, 2005. 
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1. Who is a stakeholder? 
 
2. How can stakeholders be identified? 
 
3. What are the arguments in favor of including stakeholders in decision-making processes?  What are 
the arguments against? 
 
4. How might stakeholders be included in national-level decision-making processes?  In international or 
transnational decision-making processes? 
 
5. How might stakeholders get involved in monitoring compliance?  
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Table 1: Moments and Forms of Stakeholder or Public Group Involvement 
 
 
Moment of Involvement Form of Involvement 
Demand Formulation group formation, issue or problem framing, develop group position 
Agenda-Setting disseminate group position, recruit support from other stakeholders/ public/ government officials 
Prior Impact Assessment assemble information, data analysis, participation in hearings or meetings 
Deliberation 
present group positions in deliberative forums, 
provide information and arguments in response 
to others’ criticisms of position, modify group 
positions as needed to avoid least favorable 
outcomes,  
Decision 
present information and views to legislators or 
officials, counter unfavorable information and 
views presented by competing groups 
Implementation 
comply with rules addressed to members of 
group, assist in carrying out policy, provide 
information about incomplete implementation by 
officials, providing information about 
noncompliance with rules  
Review information gathering and dissemination, judgment of policy’s impact on outcomes 
Experimentation and Innovation 
develop own or endorse other’s ideas for 
innovations, assemble information about 
successful and unsuccessful experiments 
elsewhere, disseminate proposals for 
innovations or experiments, recruit support from 
other stakeholders/public/government officials 
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Table 2: Examples of Methods used to Select Participants for Consultative Processes 
 
 
Process Selection Method 
Ministerial Regional Consultative Forum 
Queensland, Australia 
 
 
Patrick Bishop, “Developing capacity: The 
reasonable conversation of democratic politics,” 
Building Trust through Civic Engagement United 
Nations Publication ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/120 
(2008), p. 81 
Participants at initial conferences were asked to 
name five “undisputed community leaders.”  
Those leaders were asked to nominate persons 
from 11 specified sectors.  Membership was 
chosen from those persons with attention to 
including residents of a variety of places.  They 
meet periodically with Queensland State 
ministers. 
Parity Commissions     Austria 
 
 
Andreas Henkel, “The Austrian Example,” 
Building Trust through Civic Engagement United 
Nations Publication ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/120 
(2008), pp. 99-100 
Government officials and leaders of four major 
social organizations: Trade Union Federation, 
Federal Economic Chamber, Federal Chamber 
of Labor, and Chamber of Agriculture (the last 3 
being organizations employers, workers, and 
farmers are required to join) 
Naga City Empowerment Ordinance 
Naga City, Philippines 
 
Jesse Manalastas Robredo, “Civic engagement 
in policy development at the local government 
level” Building Trust through Civic Engagement 
United Nations Publication 
ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/120 (2008), p. 106-07 
City government gives the Naga City People’s 
Council, the federation of city- accredited civil 
society organizations active in Naga, power to 
name at least 25% of members of all city 
government standing committees and city-
established special  bodies 
Sector Consultations     Rwanda 1996-97 
(first stage of national consultations on the 
future of the country) 
 
 
Protais Musoni, “Rebuilding trust in post-conflict 
situation through civic engagement,” Building 
Trust through Civic Engagement United Nations 
Publication ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/120 (2008), p. 
117  
Consultation groups drawn from the population 
of Cells in the country’s 1545 Sectors consist of 
10 members, 2 elected by each of five primary 
identity groups: Tutsi survivors of genocide, 
recently returned long-term Tutsi refugees, 
recently returned Hutu refugees, Hutu who 
remained in Rwanda after the genocide, Hutu 
elites 
 
 
<end> 
 
 
